• People’s Vote Marginals Poll for Represent Us

    People’s Vote Marginals Poll for Represent Us

    These tables present the findings from research into the voting intentions of 1,701 respondents in 107 marginal constituencies across England, Wales, and Scotland under different hypothetical scenarios following a UK Parliament vote against the final Brexit deal negotiated by the UK government, conducted by ICM Unlimited on behalf of Represent Us.

    The findings reveal that, in the scenario of a general election following Parliament voting against the government’s final Brexit deal, the Labour Party would be electorally better off promising to support a popular vote on their re-negotiated Brexit deal as opposed to ruling one out. This pattern is especially pronounced in the 48 ‘Heavily leave’ constituencies.

    • First Voting Intentions Question, Q5: If Parliament votes against the final Brexit deal … there may be a general election. Opposition parties will probably promise to negotiate a better deal. Which party would you vote for in a general election in these circumstances?
    • Second Voting Intentions Question, Q6: Which party would you vote for in that general election if… in their general election manifestos, Labour, the Lib Dems, and the SNP promise that the people will get to vote on any Brexit deal, but the Conservatives rule this out?
    • Third Voting Intentions Question, Q7: Which party would you vote for in that general election if… in their general election manifestos, only the Lib Dems and the SNP promise that the people will get to vote on any Brexit deal, while Labour and the Conservatives rule this out?

    Summary of ICM Voting Intentions figures at each question for each sample: ICM VI figures at Q5, Q6, Q7

    England & Wales tables, 84 constituencies, n=1201: Represent Us Poll_bpc_Eng&Wales (18-09-18)

    ‘Remain / evenly balanced’ tables, 34 constituencies, n=500: Represent Us Poll_bpc_Remain & balanced (18-09-18)

    ‘Heavily leave’ tables, 48 constituencies, n=701: Represent Us Poll_bpc_Leave (18-09-18)

    Scotland tables, 25 constituencies, n=500: Represent Us Poll_bpc_Scotland (18-09-18)

    ICM interviewed a sample of 1,701 adults aged 18+ in the relevant constituencies online between 4 and 12 September 2018. Demographic quotas were set to ensure a representative sample. At the analysis stage, data has been weighted to the profile of each of the target populations: the 82 England and Wales constituencies (n=1,201), the 34 ‘Remain / evenly-balanced’ constituencies (n=500) and the 48 ‘Heavily leave’ constituencies (n=701) that comprise the England & Wales sample, and the 25 Scotland constituencies (n=500).

  • What do Brits think of Trump?

    ICM’s View: What do Brits think of Trump?

     Trump UK Visit - An ICMUnlimited Perspective

     

    Back in July, we wanted to see what the British public thought of President Trump before his visit to these shores.

    We started by asking if the British public supported the visit. Given we asked a very similar question when the visit was first announced back in April, we concluded that, if anything, opposition to the visit had increased. Whereas around 3 in 10 of the British public (31%) opposed the visit back in April, this hadincreased to over a third (35%) in opposition to Trump’s visit by the start of July.

    It may not come as a surprise that most of the British public are negative towards Trump, with a majority of those expressing an opinion actively disagreeing with most of the positive statements about Trump we suggested in the poll. Excluding those who don’t know, two-thirds (66%) would not like to see a politician like Trump as British Prime Minister, with the same proportion agreeing that Trump has made the world a more dangerous place. A similar proportion (64%) did not think he is generally honest and reliable at telling the truth. Of those expressing a view, a majority (57%) did not think Trump is good for the UK or is doing a good job as US President (56%).

    Despite some negative views on Brexit and the country’s political leadership emerging from our recent polls, it’s clear that Brits overall didn’t think Trump would do any better as British Prime minister. While almost a third of those expressing a view thought Trump would make a success of Brexit if he were British PM, a majority disagreed with the claim. And despite recent speculation on Theresa May’s leadership, Brits still think she is a better leader than Trump. Excluding those answering ‘don’t know’, 1 in 4 (25%) agreed that Trump is a better leader than May, compared to 48% who disagree with the claim.

    Perhaps most scathingly of all, more Brits agreed than disagreed with the statement ‘I think Trump only won the US election because of Russian support’. With the FBI enquiry still ongoing, it would appear that us Brits are sceptical at best on how Trump came to win the 2016 Presidential election against Hillary Clinton.

    It’s revealing to break down these results by EU referendum vote. Doing so shows that leavers are much more positive about Trump than remainers – and moreover, that it appears to be EU referendum vote rather than which party voted for at the previous General Election that is more closely related to views on Trump.

    As an example, for both Labour and Conservative voters at 2017, a similarly low proportion agreed that Trump is a better leader than May (25% and 27% of those expressing a view respectively). Yet there’s a much bigger bap between leavers and remainers on the same measure (36% vs. 15%), and this gap exists within both parties’ voter bases – with more than double the proportion of both Tory leavers (34%) and Labour leavers (40%) thinking May is better than Trump compared to Tory remainers (13%) and Labour remainers (17%) .

    And when directly linking Trump and Brexit, a majority (51%) of leavers expressing a view think Trump would make a success of Brexit as British PM, compared to only 17% of remainers.

    ICM’s view: the British public are clearly more critical than supportive of Trump, and this holds across most sub-groups within the British population. But sentiment towards Trump appears to be more strongly related to EU referendum vote than support for either of the main parties. This is one example of where Brexit – and the views and considerations its brought to the surface – could be more important than party support in today’s politics.

    The above analysis is based off the ICM/Guardian poll conducted between 6th – 9th July 2018. To read the full write up at the time, as well as full data tables, click here.

    Click here to download the one-pager in PDF

  • The Guardian – March 2018 Poll

    With both party leaders making major speeches on Brexit last week, the latest ICM/Guardian poll aimed to look at what impact, if any, these speeches had outside the Westminster bubble.

    The short answer is: not much.

    With fieldwork starting after the Theresa May finished her Brexit speech on Friday, these results provide a good initial read public opinion in the immediate aftermath of the two key speeches. By subtracting those who disagree with each statement shown from all those who agree with the statement, we get a net score per statement. We asked four pairs of statements on whether each leader and party’s policy on Brexit is clearer than before, has realistic aims, makes people more likely to vote for that party, and is a policy which the public overall approve of. The results are shown below:

    Guardian Brexit V2
     

    Net score
    Jeremy Corbyn and Labour’s policy on Brexit is much clearer than it was before 1%
    Theresa May and the government’s policy on Brexit is much clearer than it was before -5%
    The aims of Jeremy Corbyn and Labour in Brexit negotiations seem realistic -11%
    The aims of Theresa May and the government in Brexit negotiations seem realistic 0%
    Overall I approve of Jeremy Corbyn and Labour’s Brexit policy -13%
    Overall I approve of Theresa May and the government’s Brexit policy -3%
    Jeremy Corbyn’s policy on Brexit makes me more likely than otherwise to vote Labour -17%
    Theresa May’s policy on Brexit makes me more likely than otherwise to vote Conservative -14%

     

    This is bleak reading for both Labour and Conservatives. Our regular polling results seems to increasingly show Brexit to be a zero-sum game for the two main parties – politicians have to be seen to be taking a position, but any position chosen is generally met with more public disagreement than agreement.

    Jeremy Corbyn and Labour have the one positive net score in this poll, with one percent point more of the British public thinking that Corbyn and Labour’s Brexit policy is clearer than it was before (net score = 1%). This compares favourably with Theresa May and the government’s equivalent net score, which is on -5%.

    However, Corbynites shouldn’t see this as a cause for celebration, as whilst his and his party’s position may now be marginally more clear, it’s equally apparent that the public are not enamoured with it. On balance the British public do not think that Corbyn and Labour’s aims in Brexit negotiations are realistic (net score = -11%) or approve of their Brexit policy overall (net score = -13%). Ultimately only 1 in 4 (25%) agree that Corbyn and Labour’s position on Brexit makes them more likely to vote Labour, with more than 2 in 5 (42%) disagreeing – giving a net score of -17%.

    May and the government consistently have less negative scores than Corbyn and Labour on all areas apart from Brexit policy clarity (net score = -5%). Whilst the net score on ‘Theresa May’s policy on Brexit makes me more likely than otherwise to vote Conservative’ is marginally higher than the equivalent statement for Corbyn and Labour (net score =-14%), there are much bigger differences between the two leaders’ and parties’ perception in terms of realistic aims and overall approval.  Equal proportions of the British pubic agree and disagree that May and the government’s aims in Brexit negotiation seem realistic (net score = 0%), whilst the net score on overall approval of May and the government’s Brexit policy is -3%.

    It’s worth maintaining perspective when viewing these results. When we are comparing Brexit perceptions in terms of Labour vs. Conservative, May vs. Corbyn, we are generally comparing degrees of negativity. This is not a story of public enthusiasm and positivity – quite the opposite – so maybe the best the parties can hope for is to limit the public negativity associated with their chosen Brexit approach.

    In terms of voting intentions, there’s very little change. Labour and Conservatives trade one percent of the public’s vote intention between them, meaning the Conservatives regain a slim lead on 43% compared to Labour’s 42%. But these two proportions are still very much within the margin of error on this poll, so if there was an election tomorrow, we’d still consider it too close to call. Results for the main Westminster parties are shown below, with comparison to our previous poll a fortnight ago.

    Conservatives: 43% (+1%)
    Labour: 42% (-1%)
    LibDems: 7% (nc)
    SNP: 3% (nc)

    ICM Unlimited interviewed a representative online sample of 2,030 adults aged 18+, between 2nd – 4th  March 2018. Interviews were conducted across the country and the results have been weighted to the profile of all adults. ICM is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules.

  • The Guardian – Brexit Mega Poll

    A nation (still) divided

    A landmark ICM/Guardian poll, released today, shows a nation still starkly divided along the lines of the 2016 EU Referendum.

    ICM interviewed a representative sample of over 5,000 respondents across Great Britain. This is more than twice the number of interviews usually conducted in the regular ICM/Guardian polls, and five times the number of interviews often achieved in other polls. The increased sample size not only allows for a greater confidence in the statistical reliability of the overall results, but also allows for a more detailed analysis of different groups within the British population.

    If there was a referendum tomorrow, 45% of our poll’s respondents would vote Remain, compared to 43% who would vote leave. This result is similar to when we last asked the question in early December (8th -10th, which recorded 46% Remain versus 43% Leave), and so lends weight to the claim that the British public may have become slightly more pro-Remain since the EU referendum. But these shifts should not be exaggerated – on the results of this poll of 5,000 the result of a second EU referendum would be far from a foregone conclusion.

    The possible slight shift towards remain cannot be attributed to Leavers changing their mind. The vast majority – 9 in 10 – of those who voted either Remain or Leave in the 2016 referendum say they would vote in exactly the same way in a second referendum, and the numbers swapping sides effectively cancel each other out. Any growth in Remain support seems to be coming from those who did not vote or cannot remember how they voted in 2016, with twice as many of these people saying they would vote Remain (27%) as Leave (14%) in a future referendum.

    There are also different implications for the two main Westminster parties. When asking respondents to recall their 2016 EU referendum vote, those with a Labour MP in England and Wales were more likely to have voted Remain than Leave, whilst the opposite is true for those in a Conservative held constituency. Fast-forward to a hypothetical second referendum, and the pro-Leave lead in Conservative held seats has held remarkably steady, staying exactly the same at 7% points.  Yet the pro-Remain lead in Labour held seats has shown substantial growth over the same period. In safe Labour seats, the pro-remain lead has doubled from 4% points to 8% points, whilst in marginal Labour seats, the Remain lead has tripled from 3% to 9% points.

    Whilst any gains for Remain sentiment could be attributed to increases in Labour held seats and amongst those who didn’t vote in 2016, the overall picture emerging from this poll is clear: the British public remain entrenched in their views on Brexit. This divide holds true for perceptions of the likely impact of Brexit, as shown in the tables below. A majority (58%) of 2016 Leavers think Brexit will have a positive impact on the economy, contrasting with three quarters (75%) of Remainers who think it will have a negative impact. A majority (55%) of those who voted Leave think Brexit will make no difference to their own finances, whilst a similar proportion (53%) of Remainers think Brexit will have a negative impact on their personal finances. When asked on the impact of Brexit on the way of life in Britain in general a similar divide is apparent, with 62% of Leavers thinking Brexit will be positive but 66% of Remainers thinking Brexit will be negative.

     

    Impact of Brexit on the British economy
    Overall 2016 Remainers 2016 Leavers
    Positive impact 32% 9% 58%
    Negative impact 43% 75% 12%
    Makes no difference 13% 6% 19%
    Don’t know 13% 9% 11%

     

    Impact of Brexit on your own personal finances
    Overall 2016 Remainers 2016 Leavers
    Positive impact 13% 5% 23%
    Negative impact 30% 53% 10%
    Makes no difference 41% 27% 55%
    Don’t know 16% 15% 12%

     

    Impact of Brexit the way of life in Britain today in general
    Overall 2016 Remainers 2016 Leavers
    Positive impact 33% 9% 62%
    Negative impact 36% 66% 8%
    Makes no difference 19% 15% 22%
    Don’t know 12% 8% 30%

     

    On support for a second referendum, more agree than disagree that the British public should have the chance to take a final decision on whether or not to leave the EU in another referendum when the outcome of the negotiation is known (47% vs. 34%). Perhaps unsurprisingly this support was split along 2016 lines, with a majority of 2016 Remainers agreeing with the idea of a second referendum (70%) and a majority of Leavers disagreeing (59%). Nevertheless, there are possible signs that opposition to a second referendum amongst Leavers could be softening, as a quarter (25%) of those who voted Leave in 2016 agree that the public should have the chance to take final decision on whether or not to leave the EU in a second referendum once negotiations conclude. This figure is higher than the 14% of people who voted Remain in the 2016 referendum who disagree with the idea of holding a second referendum.

    We also included our standard vote intention figures in this poll. These show the Conservatives up one percentage point from the previous poll, now matching Labour on 41%. The Lib Dems are on 7%, UKIP on 4%, whilst the Greens and SNP on 3% each.

    ICM Unlimited interviewed a representative online sample of 5,075 adults aged 18+, between 10th – 19th January 2018. Interviews were conducted across the country and the results have been weighted to the profile of all adults. ICM is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules.

  • The Guardian September Poll

    The idea that the public are sleep-walking into the potential breakup of the UK as a result of Brexit conditions is evidenced by the latest ICM/Guardian poll.

    While a (slim) majority would be “disappointed” to see either Scotland (51%) or Wales (56%) leave the Union, Northern Ireland’s grip on public consciousness on this matter is much more precarious, with only 42% saying they would be disappointed in this particular outcome. Many are indifferent (36%) to the prospect of the Province leaving to join the Republic of Ireland, while a fifth (22%) say they would be actively “pleased” to see it go.

    With a quarter (23%) of people living in England saying they would be ‘pleased’ to see Scotland’s independence and 14% of them pleased to see Wales leave the Union, the driving force is not necessarily Nationalist sentiment in either nation (although it is evident).

    Separately, in a re-run of questions asked last July, public expectations on the economic and financial implications of Brexit continue to reflect a pessimistic view, partially offset by higher levels of positivity about a potentially changing environment in which people live (for which, we probably need to read: fewer immigrants).

    Vote intentions remain very static, with both of the two main parties on 42% share of the vote.

    ICM Unlimited interviewed a representative sample of 2,052 GB adults aged 18+ online, on 8-10th September 2017. Interviews were conducted across the country and the results have been weighted to the profile of all adults. ICM is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules.

  • The Guardian Poll – August 2017

    If the political parties approached the Summer with only a wafer-thin gap between their respective vote shares, they approach the new Parliamentary session with not even that between them. Both parties now stand on 42% apiece, a deadlock last witnessed in March 2016.

    This represents precious little movement since July, with Labour shedding a single point but the Tories and Liberal Democrats unchanged. (this poll being the first since Vince Cable grasped the leadership of the party). Figures for this month are:

    Conservatives 42%

    Labour 42%

    Liberal Democrats 7%

    Green 3%

    UKIP 3%

    SNP 2%

    Plaid Cymru *%
    Other 1%

    With Brexit negotiations the focus of continued melodrama after EU negotiator Michael Barnier reportedly told the UK to get serious, a response that involves some compromise over the ‘exit fee’ figure that the UK is willing to tolerate might be in order. In a partial repeat of a question we asked back in April on how much money the public would grudgingly agree to provide in order to exit the EU, 41% now believe that a figure of £10b would be acceptable. In April, only 15% agreed to that amount, although on that previous occasion a lower figure of £3b was presented to respondents, the absence of which now may explain some of the variation in response on this occasion.

    With 40% still saying £10b is unacceptable though, this is a clearly a difficult sell to the British public.

    And as for higher offers, the British public would likely be pretty intransigent. Only 18% would view a £20b offer as acceptable, and fewer than one in ten (9%) could contemplate a £40b pay off. Opposition to higher offer rises to as high as 75%.

    Separately, the question of President Trump’s State visit to Britain is back on the agenda. If he comes, indifference would likely characterise the reception he’d get. One in four (27%) would not care either way, with similar numbers accepting the case for a visit without being pleased (26%) or being upset but unwilling to do anything about it (20%). About one in ten would think about or actually demonstrate against the President, but slightly more (13%) say they would be pleased if he came.

    ICM Unlimited interviewed a representative online sample of 1,972 adults aged 18+ on 25-28th August 2017. Interviews were conducted across the country and the results have been weighted to the profile of all adults. ICM is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules.

  • The Guardian – July Poll

    On the day in which Brexit Secretary David Davis sits down with his EU adversary Michel Barnier for the second round of Brexit negotiations, his poker hand appears to be somewhat weakened as public support for a possible wildcard exit-without-agreement drops by 7-points, according to the latest Guardian/ICM poll.

    The UK leaving the EU regardless of what happens in negotiations enjoyed majority support back in February when 53% supported this hard line position. Now, however, the public have wobbled, with only 46% saying we should consider doing so. The call for a second referendum based on the outcome of the negotiations gains traction as a result, with 32% calling for one compared to 26% back in June.

    The wobble may be explained by increasing pessimism for Brexit’s impact on the nation. Fewer people now think Brexit will result in positive outcomes for the British economy (29% now saying so compared to 38% in February) or for the way of life in Britain today in general (33% vs. 41% in Feb 17) although no movement is observed on its impact on personal finances.

    Those people whose Brexit smiles have been wiped are not yet ready to go full pessimist though, for the most part saying that Brexit will make no difference rather than bring tangible negatives. This is might be a wobble, but not yet a full capitulation.

    There is very little change in headline vote intention numbers since the beginning of July, with only fractional movement in headline numbers. Labour (43%) lead by a point over the Tories (42%), which represents minor within margin of error movement on the last poll at the beginning of the month.

    Conservative 42% (+1)

    Labour 43% (nc)

    Lib Dem 7% (nc)

    Green 2% (-1)

    UKIP 3% (nc)

    SNP 3% (nc)

    Plaid Cymru 1% (+1)

    Other *% (nc)

    ICM Unlimited interviewed 2,046 adults aged 18+ online on 14-16th July 2017. Interviews were conducted across the country and the results have been weighted to the profile of all adults. ICM is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules.

  • The Guardian Poll – June 2017

    Labour hold a 2-point lead in the first post-election survey, which returns to basic methodological orthodoxies in light of the failure of turnout weighting and political interest weighting.

    This methodology was not a success in (unpublished online) polling immediately before the 2015 election, but would have been if it had been applied at the 2017 election. In light of this, all aspects of our polling methodology are under review.

  • The Guardian Prediction Poll – PRELIMINARY DATA

    So, there we have it. A 12-point victory for the Conservatives is ICM’s preliminary call on our final poll, up from a 7-point victory for David Cameron just two years’ ago, representing a swing to the Conservatives of 2.5% (remembering that both party shares have increased compared to 2015).

    This final poll confirms the pattern that ICM has produced over the last fortnight: a fairly healthy and static (aka strong & stable) Conservative share with consolidation of the Labour bump first witnessed after the manifesto publication.

    Our PRELIMINARY numbers for publication are (based on 1,532 interviews and compared to last Monday’s poll in The Guardian:

    Conservative 46% (+1)

    Labour 34% (nc)

    Lib Dem 7% (-1)

    SNP 5% (+1)

    Plaid Cymru *% (-1)

    Green 2% (-1)

    UKIP 5% (nc)

    Other 1% (nc)

    This compares to the 11-point lead published in The Guardian on Monday, this implying precious little movement in the last few days of the campaign.

    We should note that ICM continues to interview, aiming for another c.500 interviews by the end of the day. The numbers might change, but we would not expect them to do so by much.

    According to Electoral Calculus seat projections. This would yield a Conservative majority of 96, with 373 seats in their possession compared to 199 for Labour (which might be seen by party insiders as a decent outcome). Not so much for the Liberal Democrats though, predicted to drop to only two seats on this modelling.

    Speculation about the polls being right or wrong is ubiquitous right now, with much of it concentrating on closer run polls produced by Survation and Yougov compared to us and ComRes. Intriguingly, a number high profile political journalists continue to predict that the Tories will do better than even our poll is saying (given musings they hear from the ground), so this really has become a nail-gnawing electoral event, rather than the absolute rout that we all were fixed on just a month ago.

    The public, though, may not have been reading the journo’s stuff. Only one in ten  (12%) expects a Tory majority at the 100+  top end of the range, with a plurality (38%) believing it will be secured, but only by double figures. Fewer than one in five (17%) expect a hung parliament, with the great optimists being the 7% who think Labour will secure the keys to Number 10 (18% of Labour voters they Jeremey Corbyn will smash it).

    But whatever the outcome, there’s a strong chance that Corbyn will stay on, according to the public. As many (24%) think he should do so no matter what (a few delighted Tories are included in this number), with the same number saying so only on the basis of a Labour victory. One in five (20%) thinks he should do so, so long as Labour do better than their 2015 showing – although that’s not a very high bar given the return to two-party politics. Beating Ed Miliband’s 31% in 2015 should not present a great difficulty now, given the implosion of UKIP and the Liberal Democrats general malaise.

    So the UK goes to the polls, with voters apparently armed with sufficient information to make an informed choice – 57% say they have been on enough of a receiving end to cast their ballot effectively, with Tory voters more so (72%) than their Labour counterparts (62%). Cynics amongst us may conclude that Theresa May’s policy-light manifesto didn’t take long to consume.

    ICM Unlimited interviewed a representative online sample of 1,532 GB adults aged 18+ on 6-7th June 2017. Interviews were conducted across the country and the results have been wighted to the profile of all adults. ICM is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules.

  • The Guardian – Campaign Poll 9

    The penultimate Guardian/ICM poll of the 2017 General Election campaign continues where the previous few ICM polls left off. The Conservatives retain an 11-point lead which they saw from ICM through the weekend, following up on the 12-point lead published in The Guardian last Monday.

    Headline vote intention figures are (compared to the last Guardian poll on 30th May):

    Conservative 45% (nc)

    Labour 34% (+1)

    Lib Dem 8% (nc)

    UKIP 5% (nc)

    Green 3% (nc)

    SNP 4% (nc)

    Plaid Cymru 1% (nc)

    Other 1% (nc)

    Compared to other polls over the weekend ours slots in the higher end of the Tory lead range, one point off ComRes 12-pointer. At the other end, Survation revealed a Tory lead of only 1-point. A moderately significant dividing line has emerged between sets of pollsters, largely pivoting on how we treat turnout. This has been widely discussed in polling circles since the Labour ‘surge’, which is at least partially based on younger people and 2015 non-voters saying they will now turnout, and vote for Labour.

    Those pollsters, like us, who show higher Tory leads are implicitly sceptical about the extent of this self-reported turnout. Those with lower Labour leads largely take it at face value. But whichever turnout weighting scheme is applied, the impact is clear – as Sturgis & Jennings of the University of Southampton established in their paper, which was published yesterday.

    https://sotonpolitics.org/2017/06/04/will-turnout-weighting-prove-to-be-the-pollsters-achilles-heel-in-ge2017/.

     

    Vote estimates with turnout weight

    Vote estimates without turnout weight

    Pollster Fieldwork End Date

    CON

    LAB CON CON LAB

    CON

    (%)

    (%) lead (%) (%)

    lead

    ORB/Sunday Telegraph 4th June

    46

    37 9 44 38 6
    IpsosMORI/Standard 1st June

    45

    40 5 40 43

    -3

    Panelbase 1st June

    44

    36 8 40 39

    1

    YouGov/Times 31st May

    42

    39 3 41 39

    2

    Kantar 30th May

    43

    33 10 40 34

    6

    ICM/Guardian 29th May

    45

    33 12 41 38

    3

    Survation (phone)

    27th May

    43 37 6 43 37

    6

    ComRes/Independent 26th May 46 34 12 43 38

    5

    Opinium 24th May

    45

    35 10 42 36

    6

    Survation (internet) 20th May

    46

    34 12 43 33

    10

    GfK 14th May

    48

    28 20 45 29

    16

    Mean  = 10   Mean  = 5
          S.D.  = 4.5  S.D. = 4.9

    The imposition of historical-based turnout probabilities (i.e assuming that behaviours will tend toward the historical pattern) drives down the Labour share and upweights the Tories. Self-reported turnout scales on the other hand – largely employed by those pollsters showing the smallest Labour leads – hardly impact on the headline numbers. June 9th will show which was the better scheme, but the age profile of voters from all General Elections since 1964, courtesy of the House of Commons Library, suggests over-statement of self-reported turnout is likely. For example, it’s hard to reconcile between 38%-54% estimated turnout among 18-24s at General Elections since 1997 with one recent poll, which suggested that 82% of them would turn out to vote.

    But who knows? Jeremy Corbyn has, to common agreement, run a good campaign and has motivated sections of the society who have tended to disengagement. On Friday, we will have the answer on whether he has bucked the trend, or not.